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In the past two decades there has been a considerable amount of research conducted 
into the international price and trade effects of government intervention in the dairy 
industries of several countries.  Recently, the conclusions of those studies have been 
questioned owing to the rising concentration in the processor sector.  Since processors 
are increasingly multinational in nature and a few of them are operating around the 
globe, there is a possibility that the processors will influence both the farm and retail 
prices through their having market power.  The objectives of this paper are 
·  to analyse some alternative possibilities for market power in both input and 
product markets  
·   to show who benefits from trade liberalization under different assumptions of 
market structure.   
In  the  next  sections  the  structural  changes  in  the  international  market  will  be 
presented followed by previous studies in world dairy market and analytical models to 
show the different possibilities of market power in both input and output market will 
be discussed. 
Structural Changes in the International Dairy Industry 
 
To understand the world dairy market it is important to know the structure of the 
industry.    Market  structure  usually  refers  to  industry  concentration,  the  extent  of 
product  differentiation,  and  the  ease  with  which  new  firms  can  enter  an  industry 
Sheldon and Sperling (2001).  Market structure determines the conduct of firms and 
industry, notably pricing policy.  Conduct in turn determines economic performance, 
which  typically  is  measured  by  profits  or  price  cost  margins.    The  global  food 
processing market is dominated by big companies in the US, Europe and Japan.  As 
the  prospect  for  further  trade  liberalisation  of  the  world  dairy  market  is  gloomy, 
foreign  direct  investment  in  growth  markets  is  a  potential  attractive  alternative  to 
exporting.  The protectionist policies of most dairy importing and exporting regions 
are the driving force for most multinationals in the dairy industry Dobson (2001).    3 
Dobson  also  argues  that  multinationals  want  to  increase  economies  scale  in 
processing, to capitalise on economies associated with extended shelf life products 
and to gear up to serve large supermarkets effectively.  They must also spread the 
costs of products developments and branding. 
 
The distinguishing characteristics of an international company in contrast to a national 
or regional company are the ability to maximise the operations of a total system that is 
dominant  over  any  set  of  regional  systems.    The  economic  imperatives  for 
multinational companies are the fundamental costs and benefits of doing business.  
 
The benefits include: 
 
1.  Flexibility in the exploitation of economic resources; 
2.  Increasing oligopoly power by utilising scale (size), scope (product range), and 
experience effects beyond the limits of national boundaries; 
3.  Flexibility in the exploitation of different government policies e.g., tax rates and 
subsidies. 
 
The costs include: 
 
1.  Difficulties in managing and controlling far-flung operations; 
2.  The necessity of controlling for additional, uniquely international, variables, e.g., 
exchange  rate  fluctuations.    Besides  these  there  are  also  political  and  social 
constraints faced by corporations. 
 
The dairy industry is characterised by the pursuit of an active role in international 
trade by big dairy companies and multinational corporations.  Recently there have 
been rapid structural changes in the dairy industry.  The industry is moving from 
being strictly local to becoming international.  
 
Manchester and Blayney (1997) reviewed the market structure of the US dairy market 
and concluded that a major means of growth of companies in the dairy industry has 
been merger or acquisition.  Additional capacity and volume were usually available at 
lower cost by acquisition than by building new capacity and competing for sales.   4 
 
Tozanli (1998) indicated that as the result of mergers and acquisitions the number of 
European dairy firms is getting smaller and this concentration process is ubiquitous in 
the  European  dairy  industry  where  the  major  tendency  is  toward  an  undeniably 
oligopolistic market structure. 
 
Many of the world’s key dairy businesses have been involved in major mergers and 
acquisitions in the past decades.  Between May 2000 and June 2001 there were 150 
mergers and acquisitions throughout the world in big dairy companies (Rabobank, 
2001).  These mergers include companies such as Dairy Farmers of America in US, 
Friesland Coberco in the Netherlands, Humnan Milchunion and the new Nordmilch in 
Germany,  Swiss  Dairy  Food  in  Switzerland,  Glanbia  in  Ireland,  Arla  Foods  in 
Scandinivia and the New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Business merged to form 
Fonterra Cooperative Group in New Zealand.  Consolidation has been also dominated 
the international dairy market.  Jackson (2001) indicated that as local dairy industries 
became national, other regional companies consolidated globally.  Italy’s Parmalat 
has made more than 25 acquisitions outside Europe in the last five years.  Danone has 
moved aggressively into both Asia and South America with acquisitions in countries 
such as China, India and Argentina.  In some product categories globalisation has 
already taken place: Nestle and Unilever dominate ice cream.  Danone, Yoplait and 
Nestle dominate yoghurt and Kraft focuses primarily on cheese.  Table 1 summarises 
the top 20 dairy companies in the world.     5 
 
Table 1Top 20 Dairy Companies in the World 
Ranking  Company  Country  Sales  
USD billion 
1  Nestle  Switzerland  13 
2  Dean Food  US  9 
3  Dairy Farmers of America  US  6.7 
4  Phillip Morris(Kraft)  US  6.1 
5  Danone  France  6.0 
6  Parmalat  Italy  5.7 
7  Snow Brand Milk Product  Japan  5.5 
8  Lactallis  France  5.1 
9  Fonterra   New Zealand  5.0 
10  Unilever  UK/Netherlands  5.0 
11  Arla Foods  UK  4.4 
12  Friesland  Coberco  Dairy 
Foods 
Netherlands  4.2 
13  Campina Melkunie  Netherlands  3.6 
14  Bongrain  France  3.6 
15  Land O’Lakes  US  3.5 
16  Meiji Milk Products  Japan  3.2 
17  Morinaga Milk Industry  Japan  2.9 
18  Sodiaal  France  2.8 
19  Dairy Crest  UK  2.5 
20  Nordmilch  Germany*  2.4 
Source: Rabobank International, 2001 
 
According to Handy and Henderson (1994) most dairy manufacturing relies more on 
foreign investment than on exports as their major strategy to access foreign markets.  
This might be due to the slow trade liberalisation on dairy products, so processors 
overcome the barriers to foreign markets by being involved in direct investment in 
that market.   
   6 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  dairy  industry  has  gone  through  structural  change  as 
discussed above, most previous international dairy trade studies have assumed perfect 
competition in the international/ domestic marketing channels.  Those studies will be 




In recent years there has been a substantial amount of literature on the effect that trade 
liberalisation has had on agricultural markets.  Liberalisation of agricultural trade has 
been  studied  using  both  partial  and  general  equilibrium  models.    Many  partial 
equilibrium studies have focused on single commodities.  Others are multi-product.  
General equilibrium analyses are usually conducted at a high level of aggregation 
with a small number of broadly defined commodity groups.  Buckwell and Medland 
(1991) reviewed many of these models and discussed the problems in those studies of 
modelling of the effects of liberalising agricultural trade and the difficulties of using 
them as guides for policy action.  They argued that the difficulties on interpretation of 
the  output  from  such  analyses  arise  from  three  sources:  “technical  problems  of 
economic analysis, data and statistical problems and problems of policy relevance”.  
In  most  trade  liberalisation  studies  farmers  are  modelled  as  perfectly  competitive 
profit maximisers and the possible oligopolistic structure of upstream input suppliers 
and/or  downstream  food  processors  and  distributors  is  not  acknowledged.    The 
agricultural sector produces such a large number of individual products within a large 
number of individual firms that there are immense data problems when large-scale 
sector models are constructed.  
 
The dairy industry has been the focus of attention in many liberalisation studies, and 
attempts have been made to show with different scenarios the significant impact dairy 
liberalisation might have on the world dairy market.  Regarding the policy variables, a 
careful representation of policies is an essential component of global models to be 
applied to practical dairy trade issues.  According to Tongeren, et al. (2001) modelling 
policy  instruments  in  global  models  takes  two  forms.    The  first  one  consists  of 
developing  a  direct  structural  representation  of  the  policy  instrument  through  the 
incorporation of its mechanism.  The second approach is more indirect and measures   7 
the  policy-induced  distortion  through  a  price  transmission  relationship  linking 
international and domestic prices.  Depending on the values taken by this relationship, 
it  is  flexible  enough  to  capture  a  wide  array  of  trade  and  domestic  dairy  policy 
regimes ranging from  a perfect transmission of world prices to perfect insulation.  
Measures  of  distortion  captured  by  price  wedges  and/or  tariff  equivalents  are 
incorporated into this policy response function.  In most global dairy models these 
two forms of representing policies are being used extensively.  Concerning the price 
transmission specification, the common form of modelling policy instruments is the 
perfect  transmission  case  with  price  wedges  and  or  tariff  equivalent.    In  the  next 
section we will discuss some of the applied models in dairy trade liberalisation. 
 
There are a large number of studies of the dairy industry exploring the impact of 
different policies on the industry’s competitiveness in the international market and on 
types of modelling approach (Table 2).  The most commonly used model in the dairy 
industry is a partial equilibrium model.  This is because the dairy sector doesn’t have 
such a strong link with the rest of the economy.  Most of the studies use the modelling 
approach, of which examples of world models include the AGLINK model at OECD, 
the Food and Agricultural Policy Institute (FAPRI) model FAPRI (1998), the Centre 
for Agriculture and Rural Development(CARD) model CARD (1999), and the dairy 
model from the University of Wisconsin, Zhu, et al. (1998).  Griffith, et al. (1993) 
constructed a dairy model which incorporated the EU, US, New Zealand, Australia 
and the rest of the world’s dairy industry.  Most of the above models  assume that 
dairy farmers sell directly to consumers or their analysis focuses on the raw milk and 
the processed commodity.  These might not have a significant impact in their policy 
analysis since most of them assume perfect competition.  However, in imperfectly 
competitive markets, ignoring the marketing channel one would face a fundamental 
question of price transmission Cotterill (2002).  The dairy industry is represented by a 
vertical structure that includes the supply of raw milk, a transformation stage and the 
demand  for  the  processed  commodities.    Any  dairy  modelling  should  take  into 
consideration this industry structure. 
 
The recent study by ABARE (2001) used the AGLINK model to estimate the impact 
of market access and export subsidy.  It concluded that increasing market access and 
reducing export subsidies are seen as complementary, in that the increase in world   8 
demand that would result from improved market access may absorb some of the dairy 
exports that were subsidised.  Zhu, et al. (1998) argued that despite AGLINK being a 
typical sectoral model, when it comes to modelling the world dairy market it has 
several shortcomings.  First it lacks commodity and regional details about the world 
dairy sector.  Some dairy products are left out of the model because the demand side 
of the dairy market consists only of the three product categories –butter/skim milk 
powder, cheeses and fresh dairy products.  The consequence of this omission could be 
significant due to the disparities of resource endowment and consumption patterns 
across countries.  Second most of the non-OECD countries have been treated as a 
single region (rest of the world) with little consideration of the geographic aspects of 
these countries.  Zhu, et al. (1998) used the UW-Madison spatial equilibrium world 
dairy model with twenty-one regions and eight dairy product markets and analysed 
the  market  equilibrium  impact  of  the  full  WTO  Agreement  on  Agriculture.    The 
authors  concluded  that  the  implementation  of  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on 
Agriculture  to  2000  would  provide  only  a  small  step  toward  free  trade  in  dairy 
markets.  The conclusion and implications drawn from world dairy models indicate 
the prospect of little or no price gain for US dairy farmers from freer trade in dairy 
products.  This partially explains the lack of strong interest on the part of most US 
dairy industries in dairy trade liberalization.  Again, in a similar scenario, given the 
price reduction in store for EU milk producers, it is not surprising that many EU dairy 
farmers show little eagerness for additional dairy trade liberalization.  Meilke, et al. 
(2001) quoted the speech by the EU representative in the 2000 Ontario dairy farmers 
annual  meeting:  “since  most  countries  in  the  world  are  happy  supplying  their 
domestic markets with dairy products and have no interest in trade, there was no 
reason to change this generally happy state of affairs just to appease New Zealand”.  
This would summarise the lack of interest in the US and the EU each of whom has a 
large domestic market to open to the rest of the world. 
 
Perfectly competitive markets have been assumed in a number of models of global 
dairy trade but the appropriateness of the assumption has been questioned by some 
researchers so the findings of this study may be of interest to those involved in the 
world modelling of the dairy sector.   9 
Table 2 Summary of Empirical Work on Dairy 
Author  Policy 
Variable 












































































































An analytical model is developed to illustrate how important market structure is in 
determination of equilibrium prices and quantity.  The main objective of the analytical 
model is to show the determination of equilibrium price and quantity when different 
market  structures  are  assumed  and  also  the  impact  of  trade  policies  on  market 
structure.  To make the model as simple as possible it is assumed that there are two 
countries producing one farm product and two retail products.  Initially, zero transport 
costs and no trade barriers are assumed.  Assumptions about trade/no trade, market   10 
power  of  processor  and  regional  product  heterogeneity  give  rise  to  8  possible 
scenarios.  These are identified in Table 3.  The base model is constructed under the 
assumption of perfectly competitive behaviour on the part of all participants.  All 
other scenarios are identified by the change in specification from the base model and 
consequently comparisons are undertaken on the equilibrium prices and quantities.   
 
How the model is constructed is shown for Scenarios from 1 to 3 in Table 4 and the 
equilibrium prices determined as the result of the model specification listed in Table 
4, are shown in Table 5, which is further extended by numerical example in Table 6. 
 
As  a  basis  of  comparison  in  the  two  countries’  free  trade  scenarios,  one  region’s 
equilibrium  price  for  one  product  is  identified  because,  given  free  trade,  the  two 
regional prices are equal and the regional farm prices are identified.  
 
Scenario  one  is  the  base  model  for  the  homogeneous  traded  good  specification.  
Under this specification, there are two stage of production, zero transportation costs, 
no market power, no trade barriers and free trade in retail products and no trade in 
farm product due to logistics.  In scenario 2, the change from the base model is the 
existence of only one processing firm per country.  The combinations of trade/no 
trade in retail and farm products and different single processing firm in each country 
gives rise to a particular configuration of market power.  Free trade at the retail level 
(homogeneous products) removes a processors’ power to monopoly price while no 
trade at the farm level presents the processors with the ability to monopsony price in 
each market.  Retail prices will be identical across the two countries, farm prices will 
differ.  As it shown in Table 5 the regional equilibrium retail prices increase over the 
base model while the farm price decreases in each country as compared to the perfect 
competition model.  In Scenario 3 with no trade in farm product and with free trade in 
retail  products  and  a  few  firms  involved  in  domestic  dairy  processing,  then  the 
processors may have the ability to oligopsony but not oligopoly price.  Scenario 3 is 
developed with the assumptions of a few but different processors in each country, free 
trade  in  retail  products,  no  trade  barriers  and  no  trade  in  farm  products.    An 
oligopsony  is  modeled  by  starting  from  a  competitive  equilibrium  and  driving  a 
market power wedge into the equations.  This wedge is a price transformation based   11 
on a market power component (x ).  In this scenario the retail prices increase and the 
farm prices decline over the base model but the size of the difference from the base 
model is smaller in the case of this scenario as compared to scenario 2.   
 
The  activities  of  the  big  dairy  companies  outside  their  home  countries  have  been 
increasing  in  recent  years.    This  takes  the  form  of  transfer  of  know-how,  joint 
ventures or direct financial investment in foreign countries.  The dairy industry has 
shown itself increasingly venturesome in its expansion; consequently the market may 
be less competitive and reflect the possibility of more market power.  These activities 
beyond national borders are stimulated partly by existing cross-border barriers and 
partly  by  the  desire  to  join  forces  with  regionally  based  companies  and  staff  to 
manufacture  dairy  products  that  may  meet  wider  acceptance.    Therefore  a  model 
needs to incorporate the processors’ behaviour in a way that captures some of those 
features.  With the presence of multinational dairy companies, the world market is 
aggregated rather than segmented.  For example Nestlé, which has plants in most 
countries has more alternatives than a national company:  what to produce and where, 
which products have domestic and export subsidies from their government, in which 
countries  are  there  advantages  for  producing  which  products.    The  company  can 
observe the prices and all other necessary information through its subsidiaries and can 
maximise its overall profit based on the aggregated demand and supply it faces.  A 
company dealing only in one country might not have all those choices and also might 
have difficulty in influencing the market in the same way as a multinational. 
 
The growing presence of multinational dairy processing firms suggests the extreme 
possibility of a single processor operating across multiple countries.  If the market 
contains free trade in both retail and farm products, the same processor operating 
across two markets and homogeneous products then the processor will operate as a 
monopoly/monopsony across multiple markets.  
 
In Scenario 4 the market operates with monopsony/monopoly power across the two 
markets,  free  trade  in  retail  products  and  farm  products  and  one  processing  firm 
operating in both countries.  Price and quantity decisions made by the processor will 
relate to the aggregate consumer demand and farm supply across the two markets   12 
rather than at individual regional levels.  Since no trade barriers are assumed the two 
regions’  prices  are  equal.    In  Scenario  5  the  market  operates  as  an 
Oligopsony/Oligopoly market across countries.  In this scenario it is assumed that 
everything is the same as that of Scenario 4 with the exception that there are the same 
few processing firms operating across the two markets. 
 
The relationship between retail prices(P
r)
 and operational prices(ORP), in the case of 
an  oligopolist  is  as  follows 
r P (1 ) ORP q
h = +   which  is  calculated  from  the 
oligopoly’s profit maximization equation.  This will occur for each of the two retail 
products. 
 
The algebraic model is supported with a numerical example, in this case it is assumed 
that two countries producing one farm product and one retail products to make the 
comparison as simple as possible.  The aim of the numerical example is to show the 
equilibrium price under different market structures which are listed in Table 6.  It is 
attempted to show what impact trade policies have under different market structures.  
For example, the impact of an export subsidy has been looked at with the assumption 
of  free  trade  at  farm  and  retail  level  and  homogenous  product  under  perfect 
competition  and  oligopsony  market  structure.    We  found  that  an  export  subsidy 
reduces  the  importing  country’s  retail  price  and  consequently  the  producer  price.  
However,  the  impact  of  the  export  subsidy  in  reducing  the  importing  country’s 
producer price is made  worse with already reduced producer price due to market 
power  as  compared  to  a  scenario  which  assumes  a  perfectly  competitive  market.  
However, the price paid by consumers in the exporting country is higher than what 
they would pay in a perfectly competitive market.  The main conclusion from this is 
the impact of trade liberalization has on the producer price and consumer price varies 
based on the market structure.    13 
￿
Table 3  Scenarios for Analytical Model  
Scen
arios 
Product classification  Trade  Competition  No of 
processors 
Per region 
1  Homogeneous 
Farm and Retail 
products 
Free  trade  in  farm  and 
retail products 
Perfect competition  
At processor and farm level  
Many 
2  Homogeneous 
Farm and Retail 
products 
Free  trade  in  retail 
products and no trade in 
farm products 
Monopsony power at processor 
level and  
different in each country, 
perfect competition at farm 
level 
One 
3  Homogeneous 
Farm and Retail 
products 
Free  trade  in  retail 
products and no trade in 
farm products 
Oligopsony power at processor 
level  and  different  in  each 
country, perfect competition at 
farm level 
Small  number 
of processors 
4  Homogeneous 
Farm and Retail 
products 
Free  trade  in  retail 
products  and  free  trade 
in farm products 
Monopoly/monopsony  power 
same  across  countries  at  the 
processor  level  and  perfect 
competition at farm level 
One  across 
two regions 
5  Homogeneous 
Farm and Retail 
products 
Free  trade  in  retail 
products  and  free  trade 
in farm products 
Oligopoly/oligopsony  power 
the  same  across  region  at  the 
processor  level  and  perfect 
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Table 4 Specification Model Scenarios for Analytical Model with Homogeneous 
Products  
Base specification  
Scenario 1 









RS11= 1 a DF11 
RS12= 2 a DF12 
FS1=DF11 + DF12 +FT 
FS1= l+mPf1 
RS11 = RD11+NT1 








RS21= 1 b DF21 
RS22= 2 b DF22 
FS2 =DF21 + DF22 -FT 
FS2= L+MPf2 
RS21 = RD21– NT1 






Changed equation from 
the base 
DF11 =e-fFME1+gP11 




Changed equation from 
the base 
DF21 =E-FFME2+GP21 
DF22 =H-JFME2 +KP22 
Region 1 
Changed equation from the 
base 
DF11 =e-fOFP1 +gP11 
DF12 =h-jOFP1 +kP12 
Additional equation 
1 1 1 1 (1 ( / ) OFP Pf x e = +  
Region 2 
Changed equation from the 
base 
DF21 =E-FOFP2 +GP21 
DF22 =H-JOFP2 +KP22 
Additional equation 
2 2 2 2 (1 / ) OFP Pf x e = +  
 
Table 5 Equilibrium Price under Different Scenarios 
 Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
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The international market in dairy products departs substantially from the assumptions 
necessary  to  define  a  perfectly  competitive  market.    There  are  firms  with  market 
power which operate across markets.  In summary, it has been shown in the Tables 
that the algebraic model can be solved for the equilibrium prices and quantities in the 
case  of  processors’  market  power.    The  inclusion  of  the  conjectural  variation 
parameters allows for the testing of the presence of market power on both sides of the 
processors’ market.  The international market for dairy products currently is far from 
having a single multinational processing firm.  The scenario that is likely of most 
relevance  for  a  study  with  a  current  market  structure  is  the  scenario  with 
oligopoly/oligopsony power across markets. 
.
Region  Perfect  
competition 
Oligopsony 
Farm price   5.7563  5.1158  Region 1 
Retail price  14.492  15.63 
Farm price  5.7563  5.1158  Region 2 
Retail price  14.492  15.63 
Farm price  5.7647  5.1499  Region* 1 
Retail price  14.895  16.045 
Farm price  4.283  5.1146  Region* 2 
Retail price  13.895  15.045   16 
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